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Abstract
We consider the sequential decision problem faced by the manager of an electric
vehicle (EV) charging station, who aims to satisfy the charging demand of the customer
while minimizing cost. Since the total time needed to charge the EV up to capacity is
often less than the amount of time that the customer is away, there are opportunities to
exploit electricity spot price variations within some reservation window. We formulate
the problem as a finite horizon Markov decision process (MDP) and consider a risk-
averse objective function by optimizing under a dynamic risk measure constructed using
a convex combination of expected value and conditional value at risk (CVaR). It has
been recognized that the objective function of a risk-averse MDP lacks a practical
interpretation. Therefore, in both academic and industry practice, the dynamic risk
measure objective is often not of primary interest; instead, the risk-averse MDP is
used as a computational tool for solving problems with predefined “practical” risk and
reward objectives (termed the base model). In this paper, we study the extent to which
the two sides of this framework are compatible with each other for the EV setting —
roughly speaking, does a “more risk-averse” MDP provide lower risk in the practical
sense as well? In order to answer such a question, the effect of the degree of dynamic
risk-aversion on the optimal MDP policy is analyzed. Based on these results, we also
propose a principled approximation approach to finding an instance of the risk-averse
MDP whose optimal policy behaves well under the practical objectives of the base
model. Our numerical experiments suggest that EV charging stations can be operated
at a significantly higher level of profitability if dynamic charging is adopted and a small
amount of risk is tolerated.
1 Introduction
The recent popularity of electric vehicles (EVs) has spurred significant research attention
in the area of EV storage management from a number of perspectives. One stream of
literature, e.g., Roe et al. [2009], Clement-Nyns et al. [2010], Sundstrom and Binding [2010],
Sortomme et al. [2011], Rotering and Ilic [2011], Gan et al. [2013], Li et al. [2014], Qi
et al. [2014], takes an aggregate view of EVs and provides possible solutions to the negative
impacts of an overloaded electrical infrastructure. Broadly speaking, the literature considers
both coordinated and decentralized scheduling approaches to accomplish peak-shifting, i.e.,
flattening the load profile due to EV charging in order to reduce stress on the grid.
A complementary line of research deals with EV charging policies at the level of indi-
vidual charging stations, focusing on the optimization of metrics such as charging cost and
1
ar
X
iv
:1
60
5.
02
84
8v
2 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  3
 O
ct 
20
17
quality of service (minimal blocking/waiting times in queue-based models). For example,
Zhang et al. [2014] integrates a queueing approach with Markov decision process (MDP)
theory to optimize mean waiting times under a cost constraint. In Bayram et al. [2011],
Koutsopoulos et al. [2011], and Karbasioun et al. [2014], the authors propose optimal oper-
ating strategies for the setting where a charging station is paired with storage. The papers
Bashash et al. [2010] and Bashash et al. [2011] use a detailed model of a lithium ion battery
in order to optimize under the objective of cost of electricity and battery health degrada-
tion. The uncertainty in the use of EVs, i.e., the driving pattern of the customer, is taken
into account in the charge management policy proposed by Iversen et al. [2014].
Motivation. The motivation behind the problem examined in this paper is new, but most
closely related to the second stream of literature dealing with individual charging stations.
Here, we consider the point of view of a firm that owns charging stations located in public
areas, such as parking garages, gas stations, or hotels. The objective is to manage the
charging process for a single charger and a single vehicle within the reservation window so
that energy costs are low when subjected to stochastic spot prices. When the spot price
is high, the manager has an incentive to delay charging until the price falls (at the risk of
even higher prices in the future or the inability to fully charge the vehicle).
In order to reap the environmental and societal benefits that come with the widespread
adoption of electric vehicles, a dense network of charging stations located nationwide is
required, but such infrastructure is not possible without an economic incentive. Unfortu-
nately, there is concern that such an incentive for owning and operating EV infrastructure
may not exist in the current climate [Schroeder and Traber, 2012, Chang et al., 2012, Robin-
son et al., 2014]. Methods to make ownership of EV charging stations a more viable business
model are thus a crucial area of study.
Reservation-based EV charging stations have recently grown in popularity as a way to
increase efficiency and decrease range anxiety (i.e., the fear of being stranded away from a
charging station with an empty battery). The implementation of reservation-based systems
may have also stemmed from social and etiquette considerations: Caperello et al. [2013]
suggest that the lack of well-understood behavioral guidelines (e.g., when is it acceptable
to unplug another vehicle that is finished charging?) can inhibit the use of public charging
stations due to the increased uncertainty. Through surveys, they find that many EV drivers
prefer a reservation system so as to mitigate this uncertainty. Since 2011, reservation capa-
bilities at public charging stations have been made available via smart-phone applications
(see, e.g., ChargePoint, E-Charge HK in Hong Kong, and NextCharge). Moreover, the rise
of the “sharing economy” has led to innovative peer-to-peer EV charging solutions such as
Chargie,1 where users can make reservations for time on privately owned charging stations.
1https://www.chargie.net/
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Problem Overview. The typical scenario (see Figure 1) in our model includes the follow-
ing sequence of events: (1) a customer reserves a charging window [0, τ ] at some time t < 0,
where τ can be longer than the time required for a full charge; (2) she drops off the EV at
the charging station at t = 0; (3) the vehicle is (dynamically) charged during the interval
[0, τ ]; (4) the customer returns at the end of the reservation window, with the expectation
that the vehicle is adequately charged (if not, she given an inconvenience compensation).
From the point of view of the overall model, the reservation length τ is random variable.
Since the dynamic charging policy from [0, τ ] is determined after τ is known, a family of
optimal control problems parameterized by τ are eventually solved. The theoretical analysis
of the control problem, however, is always for a given τ = T .
t = 0 t = ⌧
dynamic charging
customer chooses [0, ⌧ ]
t < 0
customer compensated
Figure 1: Sequence of Events
In a 2016 patent application by Google describing “mediator device for smart electric
vehicle charging,” this exact situation is described as follows:
Modern EVSEs are equipped with technology that allows them to communicate
with electric vehicles to control the charging rate. This capability allows the
charging station to communicate the amount of charging capacity available to
the EV. . . However, in many cases it is not necessary for the EV to charge the
battery at the full rate. For example, EV drivers may drive their car[s] to work
and leave [them] plugged in all day, even though charging completes in only a
few hours. [Wytock et al., 2016]
We note that if the EV charging station is run on a first-come, first-served basis without
reservations, our model could also be applicable if the smart-phone application asks the
customer for an anticipated return time τ . The model is also flexible enough to exist within
a larger strategy: for example, if the firm prefers to guarantee a full charge, then the interval
[0, τ ] could be split so that dynamic charging occurs first using our model, before switching
to a static charging policy at the end.
The decision and risk analysis problem here is to balance the “risk” of the customer
returning to an undercharged vehicle and the “reward” of completing a satisfactory charge
at a reasonable cost. The extent to which this is an interesting problem depends largely
on the power output of the charging station. For example, residential charging is typically
quite slow and there is little opportunity to dynamically adjust the charging rate: Level 1
charging provides around 1.4 kW of output (a few miles per hour of charge) and Level 2
charging provides around 7.7 kW (or 20 miles per hour of charge).
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However, technological improvements have resulted in the availability of high-powered
chargers and it is now increasingly common for the customer to be away for a length
of time that is longer than the amount of time needed to fully charge the EV. DC fast
charging stations currently provide between 50 kW and 120 kW of power (see, e.g., Tesla’s
Supercharger), providing 180 to 240 miles per hour of charge. As of 2017, a new tier of
charging stations, billed as “ultra-fast” DC charging,23 are slowly becoming available and
can operate at a power rating of 350 to 400 kW. Given the high costs of the DC fast charging
technology, estimated at $65,000–$70,000 compared to $15,000-$18,000 for a Level 2 charger
[U.S. Department of Energy, 2012] (see also Bay Area Council [2011] and Schroeder and
Traber [2012] for similar estimates), it is clear that optimal control policies can help ease
the economics of such an investment. Indeed, our conversations with industry colleagues
confirm that this problem is faced by owners of EV charging stations today.
The Importance of Risk. We suppose that the firm can directly interact with a spot
energy market. The optimal policy depends on the spot prices of electricity Pt in the
following way: if Pt is high, then we have a possible incentive to delay charging and buy later
at a lower price. Of course, the trade-off here is that whenever charging is delayed, the risk of
an inconvenienced customer (one who returns to a partially charged vehicle) increases. We
assume in this paper that an inconvenienced customer is provided a financial compensation
for her inconvenience when a vehicle is not charged adequately. The compensation includes
a refund plus an additional spot price-dependent amount to cover the cost of purchasing
the energy elsewhere. Therefore, the cost function used in our model is of the form
total cost = cost of energy + inconvenience compensation,
which we emphasize is a true financial cost to the firm. Although a risk-neutral model
(i.e., one that optimizes the expectation of the total cost) makes a trade-off between the
“cost of energy” and the “inconvenience compensation” in order to minimize total cost, the
following thought-experiment reveals that there are additional preferences that may not
be captured under risk-neutrality: given two operating policies pi1 and pi2 that achieve the
same expected total cost, where pi1 focuses on a low “inconvenience cost” at the expense of
a high “cost of energy” and pi2 focuses on the opposite, which policy does one prefer? Since
an inconvenienced customer may come with additional externalities (e.g., negative word of
mouth, lost future sales) that are difficult to quantify, it is likely that pi1 is the preferred
policy. This hints at the existence of risk-aversion toward events where the customer is
inconvenienced.
Our proposed model uses the framework of risk-averse MDPs, introduced in Ruszczyn´ski
[2010], to capture the important issue of sequential risk in this problem. In this framework,
2https://www.chargepoint.com/products/commercial/express-plus/
3https://www.engadget.com/2017/07/16/porsche-installs-first-super-fast-ev-chargers/
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the cost function remains unchanged: it continues to represent the true financial cost to
the firm, as discussed above, but we replace the expected value operator with a dynamic
risk measure [Frittelli and Gianin, 2004, Riedel, 2004, Pflug and Ruszczyn´ski, 2005, Boda
and Filar, 2006, Cheridito et al., 2006, Acciaio and Penner, 2011] in order to account for
uncertain outcomes in a different way. When a time-consistency property holds for the
dynamic risk measure (see Cheridito et al. [2006] and Ruszczyn´ski [2010]), the risk-averse
objective function for a finite horizon T becomes:
min
pi∈Π
Cpi0 + ρ0
(
Cpi1 + ρ1
(
Cpi2 + · · ·+ ρT−1(CpiT ) · · ·
))
, (1)
where Π is a set of policies, {Cpit } are costs incurred by following policy pi, and {ρt} are one-
step coherent risk measures (i.e., components of the overall dynamic risk measure). A major
computational advantage of this representation is that the familiar Bellman recursion applies
for the value functions of the optimal risk-averse policy, allowing for established solution
techniques to be adapted to the risk-averse setting. We provide a theoretical analysis of the
impact of risk-aversion on the structure of the optimal policy for our EV charging problem.
Related work to ours include risk-averse single and multi-stage newsvendor models [Bouakiz
and Sobel, 1992, Eeckhoudt et al., 1995, Mart´ınez-De-Albe´niz and Simchi-Levi, 2006, Gotoh
and Takano, 2007, Ahmed et al., 2007, Chen et al., 2009, Choi et al., 2011] and risk-averse
joint-inventory and pricing models [Chen et al., 2007, Yang, 2017]. For single stage problems,
the risk metrics used in these papers include conditional value at risk (CVaR) [Rockafellar
and Uryasev, 2000], exponential utility, and mean-variance, while for multi-stage problems,
they employ either additive utility functions or dynamic (coherent) risk measures. Choi et al.
[2011] discuss the merits of translation invariance and positive homogeneity, two properties
that our choice of methodology, dynamic coherent risk measures, possesses which the utility
function framework does not.
Interpretability of the Risk-Averse Objective. In this paper, we address the issue of
interpretability of (1) in a new way. It has been acknowledged that the main obstacle to the
practicality of dynamic risk measures in MDPs is the lack of a clear economic interpretation
[Rudloff et al., 2014, Iancu et al., 2015]. If ρt = Et for all t, then (1) is equivalent to a
quantity familiar to any practitioner, the expected total cost: minpi E
[∑
tC
pi
t
]
. On the
other hand, if ρt is chosen to be, say, CVaR, then (1) is evaluated with a nested version of
CVaR [Cheridito and Stadje, 2009] and does not further simplify into a practical quantity.
Nevertheless, the theoretical grounding and associated computational advantages of the
framework [Ruszczyn´ski, 2010, Philpott and de Matos, 2012, Philpott et al., 2013] makes it
an attractive model for many: in fact, the Brazilian National System Operator (ONS) has
operationalized a monthly hydrothermal planning strategy based on an MDP under nested
mean-CVaR [Maceira et al., 2015]. To account for the interpretability issue, it is very
common in both the literature and in practice to evaluate risk-averse policies generated by
a risk-averse MDP along two dimensions, practical risk and practical reward, which may or
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may not be directly related to the cost function of the MDP. See Figure 2 for an illustration
of this approach. A few illustrative examples are listed below:
• Philpott and de Matos [2012] solve a hydro-thermal scheduling problem under a nested
mean-CVaR risk measure. The practical reward is taken to be the (negative) “total
operational cost” and the practical risk is the “number of violations where the national
storage level is below a minimum threshold.” The authors explicitly acknowledge the
discrepancy by stating that the dynamic risk measure objective “is arguably different
from focusing on the distribution of the total annual cost, and controlling the extent
of its upper tail.”
• Shapiro et al. [2013] optimize the Brazilian interconnected power system under a
nested mean-CVaR risk measure, but effectiveness of the policy is gauged using the
“expected cost” versus the “90%, 95%, and 99% quantiles of the cost.”
• C¸avus and Ruszczyn´ski [2014] compute risk-averse policies under a nested mean-
semideviation risk measure for a credit limit decision problem and evaluates them
by observing the profit distribution, where the implicit trade-off is between “expected
profit” and “frequency of negative profits.”
• Lin et al. [2015] solve the Almgren and Chriss [2001] trade execution model under a
general dynamic measure of risk. The numerical work evaluates the policies on the
practical metrics of (negative) “mean cost” versus the “mean cost of the 30% worst
samples.”
• Maceira et al. [2015] use a nested mean-CVaR for the hydro-planning MDP, but
chooses the practical reward to be (negative) “expected value of operational cost”
and practical risk to be “expected value of energy not supplied.”
• Collado et al. [2017] consider a stochastic path detection problem under nested mean-
semideviation. The practical trade-off being considered is the “expected non-detection
probability” versus the “variance of the non-detection probability.”
We emphasize that in each of these papers, the approach of Figure 2 is used. Although
it is related, the dynamic risk measure objective used to find the policy does not match
the practical objectives used for evaluation. Thus, we can view the risk-averse MDP as a
computational tool for generating “risk-averse” policies that solve another model, which we
term the base model. Based on trade-offs studied in the papers listed above, it is reasonable
to specify a base model of the form
maximizepi [Practical Reward](pi) subject to [Practical Risk](pi) ≤ ε, (2)
where pi is an operating policy and ε is a parameter that controls the risk. Hence, the
approach under discussion is when pi is chosen to be the solution of a risk-averse MDP.
6
Relationship?
PolicyRisk-averse MDP
Policy evaluation
Problem
Dynamic risk
Practical risk
Practical reward
Figure 2: Evaluation using Practical Metrics of Risk and Reward
We note that this approach is typically not applied in a rigorous manner; the relationship
between risk-aversion in the dynamic risk measure sense and the practical risk and reward is
generally not well-understood. Our paper poses the question: does increased risk-aversion in
the risk-averse MDP lead to lower practical risk in the base model as well? Such a property
is desired as it indicates a compatibility between the risk-averse MDP and the practical
objective. Without such a compatibility, the motivation for utilizing the risk-averse MDP
model is quite weak. In this paper, we consider this question in the context of the dynamic
EV charging problem along with several practical metrics that are of interest to industry.
We show conditions under which compatibility holds for our model.
In current practice, the decision-maker is often limited by a computing budget and
thus heuristically selects a few MDPs to solve. If one of the resulting policies generates an
acceptable trade-off between practical risk and reward, then it is chosen for implementation;
see, e.g.,[Philpott and de Matos, 2012, Tables 6-7], [Shapiro et al., 2013, Figure 11], [C¸avus
and Ruszczyn´ski, 2014, Table 8], and [Maceira et al., 2015, Figure 6] for examples of this
general ad-hoc approach. Ideally, the decision-maker should investigate a larger set of risk-
averse MDP policies. Along these lines, we offer a method of approximating the practical
risk and reward for a spectrum of risk-averse policies using polynomial optimization and
sum of squares constraints [Ahmadi and Majumdar, 2015]. The idea is that by solving a
small number of risk-averse MDPs, our structural results allow us to reliably approximate
the performance of an entire set of risk-averse optimal policies, providing practitioners an
accessible means to explore a wider range of risk preferences. We then take advantage of
the approximations to provide a systematic method for selecting a policy corresponding to
a risk-averse MDP by analyzing the trade-offs of the practical metrics.
Our Results. The main contributions of this paper, some of which are of general interest
beyond the EV application, are summarized below.
• We present a novel risk-averse, sequential model of the EV charging problem. The
model is formulated using the framework of risk-averse MDPs with dynamic risk
measures, constructed using one step risk measures that are a convex combination of
expectation and conditional value at risk.
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• We analyze the structural properties of the optimal policy. A main result here states
that the charging thresholds of the optimal policy are nonincreasing in the current
spot price (under a spot-price model incorporating seasonality, mean-reversion, and
jumps) for any degree of dynamic risk-aversion.
• Related to the above results, we find conditions under which our risk-averse MDP is
compatible (a notion that we will define) with a class of practical metrics of risk and
reward when the approach of Figure 2 is adopted. This can be taken as justification
that the use dynamic risk measures in risk-averse MDPs is an appropriate methodology
in the case of the dynamic EV charging problem we present here.
• We propose an approximation strategy based on regression and polynomial optimiza-
tion in order to guide the policy selection process, i.e., we address the question: how
do we choose a risk-averse MDP such that the resulting optimal policy behaves well
under the practical metrics?
• Finally, we demonstrate the proposed methods on a case study using spot price data
from the California ISO (CAISO) and parking time distributions estimated from pub-
lic garages in Santa Monica, California.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present in Section 2 the mathematical
model of the problem. In Section 3, we provide a structural analysis of the model. Next,
in Section 4, we analyze the relationship of the policy to practical metrics of risk and
reward and identify when our notion of compatibility holds. Lastly, the case study and the
associated numerical work is presented in Section 6.
2 Mathematical Formulation
In this section, we first give a mathematical formulation of the dynamic EV charging prob-
lem. We then proceed to give a brief overview of dynamic risk measures in MDPs, along
with the objective function used in the base model and objective used in the risk-averse
MDP.
2.1 Dynamic EV Charging Model
Each realization T of the reservation length τ and each risk preference β defines a sequential
decision problem of length T + 1, and in this paper, we are interested in the entire class
of problems parameterized by T and β (hence, many relevant quantities will be indexed by
both T and β). In this section and Section 3, we define and analyze the structure of the
MDP under a fixed T and β. Next, in Section 4, we characterize the relationship between
MDPs with varying β and also seek to understand the how the optimal policies behave
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when evaluated using practical metrics of risk. The full distribution of τ is then taken into
account in the numerical experiments of Section 6.
In our MDP, charging decisions are made at t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T −1}, which are measured in
units of 15 minutes. The time-based access fee to the charging station, paid by the customer
per 15 minutes, is denoted cf . The customer returns at time T and if applicable, receives
an inconvenience compensation at time T + 1 if an inadequate charge was provided (see
Section 2.1.2). At every period t, our charging decision is a rate x ∈ [0, xmax] and using
normalized units, we assume that x units of energy are obtained between t and t + 1. Let
Rt ∈ [0, Rmax] =: R be the amount of energy in storage at time t, where the transition
function for Rt is given by Rt+1 = Rt +xt, provided that the charging decision xt is chosen
in the constraint set X (Rt) = {x : 0 ≤ x ≤ min{Rmax −Rt, xmax}}.
Given our previous discussion on the wide range of charging station power ratings (1.4
kW to 400 kW), we note that it is increasingly likely that the maximum charge per period
xmax is larger than Rmax. This paper will explicitly consider two parameter regimes: (1)
the general charging regime where xmax is unrestricted and (2) the fast charging regime
where xmax is larger than Rmax. We note that xmax depends on both the power output of
the charging station and the length of a decision epoch; thus, the “fast charging regime” is
a slight misnomer in that it arises when either the power output is high or the length of a
decision epoch is large. The reason for the distinction between the two parameter regimes
is that certain theorems (the results of Section 4) only hold in the fast charging case. Unless
specifically noted, we consider the general charging regime, where no assumptions are made
on xmax.
2.1.1 Spot Price Dynamics
Now let us specify the dynamics of the spot price process {Pt}. Electricity prices exhibit
several characteristics that should be captured: seasonality, mean-reversion, jumps, and
potentially negative prices [Eydeland and Wolyniec, 2003, Kim and Powell, 2011, Zhou
et al., 2015]. Because many conversations regarding dynamic EV charging technology are
occurring in California, we obtained electricity price data from the California (CAISO)
fifteen-minute market. These data, as shown in Figure 3, exhibits frequent negative prices
but relatively light tails when compared to other markets (see, e.g., the five-minute NYISO
real-time market).
Given these observations and the discrete-time decision problem, a reasonable choice
to accommodate for the negative prices is to employ a discrete-time version of the jump-
diffusion model of Cartea and Figueroa [2005] to directly fit the spot prices, rather than
the log spot price. The continuous-time model is given by P ct = g(t) + Y
c
t . Here, g(t)
is a deterministic (sinusoidal) seasonality function and Y ct consists of a mean reverting
component and a jump component; the dynamics are given by dY ct = κY (µY − Y ct ) dt +
σY dWt + JdNt, where κY > 0 is the mean reversion parameter, θY is the long term mean
9
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Figure 3: Historical Fifteen-Minute CAISO Prices, Winter 2016-2017
of the process, σY > 0 is the volatility, Wt is a standard Brownian motion, J is a normally
distributed jump size with mean µJ and variance σ
2
J , and Nt is a Poisson process with rate
λ (all independent from one another).
The discrete-time approximation Pt of the continuous-time model at resolution ∆t can
be obtained by letting
Pt = g(t) + Yt and Yt+∆t = Yt e
−κY ∆t + µY (1− e−κY ∆t) + ξt+∆t +Xt+∆t Jt+∆t, (3)
where {ξt} is a sequence of iid N
(
0, σ2Y /(2κY )(1 − e−2κY ∆t)
)
random variables, {Xt} is a
Bernoulli process with parameter λ∆t, and {Jt} is a sequence of iid N (µJ , σ2J) jumps (a
Bernoulli process approximation of the Poisson process, which assumes at most one jump
per period). ξt+∆t, Xt+∆t, and Jt+∆t are mutually independent. We utilize (3) with ∆t = 1
for the remainder of this paper and assume that each time step ∆t is 15 minutes. Let
(Ω,F ,P) be the probability space on which all random variables are defined, where {ξt},
{Xt}, and {Jt} are adapted to a filtration {Ft}Tt=0, with {∅,Ω} = F0 ⊆ F1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ FT ⊆ F .
Note that by (3), we can define a random variable
ψt+1 = g(t+ 1)− g(t) e−κY + µY (1− e−κY ) + ξt+1 +Xt+1 Jt+1, (4)
which does not depend on the current spot price p, such that p e−κY + ψt+1 has the same
distribution as (Pt+1 |Pt = p). Similarly, we define ψt+1,Y = ψt+1−g(t+1), also independent
of the current spot price p, such that p e−κY +ψt+1,Y has the same distribution as (Yt+1 |Pt =
p). Both ψt+1 and ψt+1,Y are distributed as a mixture of normals. Throughout this paper,
we use the notation Pt+1(p) to represent a random variable equal in distribution (Pt+1 |Pt =
p) and Yt+1(p) to represent (Yt+1 |Yt = p − g(t)) in order to clarify certain expressions.
Calibration details and the resulting model parameters are discussed in Section 6.
2.1.2 Customer Compensation
To properly assess the trade-offs in our model, we need to specify the compensation structure
for a customer who returns to a vehicle with charge level RT . Because our current optimal
10
control problem has only seen preliminary discussion [Wytock et al., 2016], there is no
concrete, implemented example of how (and if) customers should be compensated in the case
of a partial charge. Here, we present one reasonable choice that has arisen in discussion and
remark that alternative structures satisfying similar convexity and monotonicity properties
can be introduced into the model without significant difficulty.
Under a standard charging policy, the customer expects her vehicle to either be fully
charged up to Rmax or has received a continuous charge for T periods, i.e., charged up to
R0 + Txmax. Therefore, the energy shortage is h(RT ) = [min(R0 + Txmax, Rmax) − RT ].
Let pref be a deterministic amount that represents the retail price per unit of energy, so
that the customer is entitled to a refund of at least h(RT ) pref. The compensation also
includes two additional payments, an inconvenience amount of γh per unit of shortage and
a market-dependent amount of γY (PT+1 − g(T + 1)) per unit of shortage for some positive,
increasing function γY (see Assumption 1). The idea here is that if the shortage occurs in
a time of high market prices (i.e., relative to the seasonality function), then the customer
receives an additional payment to cover her costs at period T + 1. The total inconvenience
compensation at time T + 1 is given by:
cT+1(ST , PT+1) = [1 + γh h(RT ) + γY (PT+1 − g(T + 1))]h(RT ) pref.
The positivity of γY is motivated by the notion that we should never reduce compensation
payments to the customer, even in times of low or negative prices.
2.1.3 One-Period Cost Function
The state variable for this problem is St = (Rt, Pt), which takes values in the state space
S = R × R. We are now ready to define the cost function, which is given by ct(St, xt) =
(xtPt − cf ) 1{t<T} for t = 0, 1, . . . , T and the terminal cost is cT+1(ST , PT+1), as defined
above. We emphasize that both the cost of energy (for t < T ) and the inconvenience
compensation (for t = T + 1) should be viewed as actual financial costs to the firm, and
should not be interpreted to be artificial penalties intended to generate risk-averse policies.
All risk preferences are added after the model of the problem is defined.
Let {xpi0 , xpi1 , . . . , xpiT−1} be a charging policy (indexed by pi) where xpit : S → [0, xmax]
is the decision function at time t. When following a policy pi, we produce a sequence of
states Spi0 , S
pi
1 , . . . , S
pi
T and obtain the costs C
pi
t = ct(S
pi
t , x
pi
t (S
pi
t )), for t = 0, 1, . . . , T and
CpiT+1 = cT+1(S
pi
T , PT+1) (note that C
pi
T = 0). Let R
pi
t be the level of charge at time t if a
policy pi is followed. Let SpiT = (S
pi
0 , S
pi
1 , . . . , S
pi
T+1) be the vector representing the sequence
of states visited under policy pi with Spit = (R
pi
t , Pt).
2.2 The Base Model & Practical Metrics
We now define a broad class of practical reward and practical risk metrics, along with a
few motivating examples. Let f+T be a function mapping a state vector for the problem of
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horizon T into a “reward outcome,” so that the quantity f+T (S
pi
T ) is the random variable
describing the practical reward of policy pi. Similarly, define a function f−T so that f
−
T (S
pi
T )
is the practical risk of policy pi. Finally, let rbase and ρbase be monotone mappings from
random variables into R (e.g., E or VaR0.9) so that our metrics are given by
Practical Reward = rbase [f
+
τ (S
pi
τ )] and Practical Risk = ρbase [f
−
τ (S
pi
τ )].
Note that we have replaced T with the random variable τ , in order to incorporate the
uncertainty of the reservation horizon.
Although we have given a general definition above so that this framework can be applied
in other application settings, in the EV charging problem, our primary goal is to use dynamic
charging to reduce the cost of energy. Thus, the most sensible form of the practical reward
is given by rbase = E and
f+τ (S
pi
τ ) = cf τ −
τ∑
t=1
(Rpit −Rpit−1)Pt − [1 + γh h(Rpiτ ) + γY (Yτ+1)]h(Rpiτ ) pref, (5)
so that rbase [f
+
τ (S
pi
τ )] represents the negative of the expected cost. On the other hand, any
metric that we might reasonably want to minimize could be used for the practical risk. A
few examples are given below.
– ρbase = E and f
−
τ (S
pi
τ ) = [1 + γh h(R
pi
τ ) + γY (Yτ+1)]h(R
pi
τ ) pref gives the expected
inconvenience compensation.
– Similarly, one could also consider letting ρbase = VaR0.9 and keeping f
−
τ as defined
above so that the practical risk is the 90th quantile of the inconvenience compensation.
– ρbase = E and f
−
τ (S
pi
τ ) = 1{Rτ/Rmax≤ (1−δ)} represents the probability that Rτ is less
than some threshold of being full.
– ρbase = CVaR0.90 and f
−
τ (S
pi
τ ) = h(R
pi
τ ) represents the average amount of shortage in
the 10% worst cases.
Note that each of these risk metrics have a direct economic interpretation that can be useful
in practice. We define the base model to be
maximizepi rbase[f
+
τ (S
pi
τ )] subject to ρbase[f
−
τ (S
pi
τ )] ≤ ε, (6)
for some “trade-off” parameter ε. Constrained MDPs, such as (6), are known to be very
difficult to solve in general (see Altman [1999] for an overview), so many authors resort
to using a risk-averse MDP to approximate the base model. To reiterate our previous
discussions, we are interested in examining a notion of compatibility when policy evaluation
is performed using (6) and policy optimization is done using a risk-averse MDP.
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2.3 The Risk-Averse MDP Model
In this section, we discuss the risk-averse MDP model of Ruszczyn´ski [2010], which serves
as a surrogate to the computationally intractable base model given in (6). The eventual
goal of this paper is to search over a parameterized class of MDPs in order to obtain an
acceptable solution to (6).
The objective function of a risk-averse MDP is specified using a time-consistent dynamic
risk measure ρ0,T of the sequence of downstream costs C
pi
0 , C
pi
1 , . . . , C
pi
T+1 generated by a
policy pi. The objective is written using the notation ρ0,T (C
pi
0 , C
pi
1 , . . . , C
pi
T+1); in the risk-
neutral case, we would have ρ0,T (C
pi
0 , C
pi
1 , . . . , C
pi
T+1) = E
[∑T+1
t=0 C
pi
t
]
, but in general, we
cannot assume such an additive form. The notion of time-consistency can be summarized
as: if we prefer one stream of costs at some time in the future, and the costs from now until
then are identical, then we must also prefer the same stream of costs today ; see Ruszczyn´ski
[2010] for a precise definition. Let Zt be the space of Ft measurable random variables. It
can be shown, under some mild assumptions, that time-consistency results in the nested
formulation
ρ0,T (C
pi
0 ,C
pi
1 , . . . , C
pi
T+1) = C
pi
0 + ρ0(C
pi
1 + ρ1(C
pi
2 + · · ·+ ρT (CpiT+1) · · · )), (7)
for some one-step conditional risk measures ρt : Zt+1 → Zt.
The traditional risk-neutral optimization problem (see, e.g., Puterman [2014]) is
min
pi∈Π
E
[
T+1∑
t=0
Cpit
]
= min
pi∈Π
Cpi0 + E0
(
Cpi1 + · · ·+ ET (CpiT+1) · · ·
)
, (8)
where Et is shorthand for E( · | Ft). We define the risk-averse optimization problem as
minpi∈Π ρ0,T (Cpi0 , Cpi1 , Cpi2 , . . . , CpiT+1), where the expected sum of costs is replaced with a
dynamic risk measure ρ0,T acting on the sequence of costs. Applying the nested formulation
of (7), we see that the risk-averse formulation is a clear analog of the risk-neutral case (8)
with the conditional expectations replaced with one-step risk conditional risk measures:
min
pi∈Π
Cpi0 + ρ0
(
Cpi1 + ρ1(C
pi
2 + · · ·+ ρT−1(CpiT ) · · · )
)
. (9)
In this paper, we follow several successful applications of risk-averse MDPs in the literature
[Philpott and de Matos, 2012, Shapiro et al., 2013, Maceira et al., 2015] and take ρt to
be the mean-CVaR risk measure. Every one-step conditional risk measure ρt : Zt+1 → Zt
has a “static” (as opposed to “dynamic”) counterpart that maps a random variable to R,
instead of another random variable. To avoid confusion, we skip directly to the static case.
Define the risk measures CVaRαt : Z → R [Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000] and ρβt :
Z → R, where Z is a space of random variables, to be
CVaRαt(X) = infu
{
u+ (1− αt)−1 E
[
(X − u)+]},
ρβt(X) = (1− λt) E(X) + λt CVaRαt(X),
(10)
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where X is a random cost in Z, λt ∈ [0, 1] controls the emphasis on the tail risk, αt ∈ (0, 1)
controls the length of the tail, and βt = (λt, αt) is the degree of risk-aversion at time t. Note
that ρβt is a coherent risk measure, as axiomatized in Artzner et al. [1999], meaning that
it satisfies the properties of convexity, monotonicity, translation invariance, and positive
homogeneity. The value at risk for some risk level αt of a random variable X is defined to
be the αt-quantile, or VaRαt(X) = inf{u : P(X ≤ u) > αt}.
Thus, we henceforth consider the optimization problem (9) with ρt : Zt+1 → Zt taken
to be the conditional counterpart to ρβt : Z → R; see Ruszczyn´ski and Shapiro [2006],
Ruszczyn´ski [2010] for details and examples. Let β = (λ0, α0, λ1, α1, . . . , λT , αT ) control
the degree of dynamic risk-aversion or risk preference of the MDP. The associated dynamic
risk measure objective function is specified using β is written ρ0,T (C
pi
0 , C
pi
1 , . . . , C
pi
T+1 |β).
Let piT (β) be the (index of) an optimal policy for the decision problem of horizon T + 1
where ρt are specified using β. For convenience, we denote the decision function at time
t for the optimal policy by xt,T ( · |β). The theorem below, proved in Ruszczyn´ski [2010],
serves as the foundation for risk-averse MDPs; it is an analog of the well-known risk-neutral
Bellman recursion, with expectations replaced by one-step risk measures (in our case, they
are taken to be ρβt).
Theorem 1 (Risk-Averse Bellman Recursion, Ruszczyn´ski [2010]).
Let the boundary condition be VT,T (s |β) = ρβT [cT (s, p e−κY +ψT+1,Y )] for any state s ∈ S.
For each of the earlier time periods t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, let
Vt,T (s |β) = min
x∈X (r)
ct(s, x) + ρβt
[
Vt+1,T (r + x, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β)
]
.
The optimal policy to (9) is given by
xt,T (s |β) ∈ arg min
x∈X (r)
ct(s, x) + ρβt
[
Vt+1,T (r + x, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β)
]
,
i.e., it is greedy with respect to the optimal value function.
We now introduce some useful notation. First, it is often necessary for us to refer to a
measure of risk on the future cost distribution; hence, we define:
vt,T (r, p |β) = VaRαt
[
Vt+1,T (r, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β)
]
,
ct,T (r, p |β) = CVaRαt
[
Vt+1,T (r, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β)
]
.
We will invoke the relationship
Vt,T (s |β) = min
x∈X (r)
xp− cf + V˜t,T (r + x, p |β), (11)
where V˜t,T (r+x, p |β) = ρβt
[
Vt+1,T (r+x, p e
−κY +ψt+1 |β)
]
is called the post-decision value
function.
Before continuing, we point out that so far two optimization models, the base model
(6) and the risk-averse MDP (9), have been defined. We re-emphasize that the relationship
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between these two models is mostly explained in Figure 2, where (9) serves as a proxy for
the more computationally challenging model (6). To be more precise, we are searching for a
set of parameters β such that the solution to (9) is an acceptable solution to (6). This can
be thought of as a policy search technique, wherein one searches over a subset of candidate
policies; here, our candidate policies are solutions to different instances of the risk-averse
MDP. As we reviewed in Section 1, this overall procedure is used by many authors (see,
e.g., Philpott and de Matos [2012], Shapiro et al. [2013], C¸avus and Ruszczyn´ski [2014],
Lin et al. [2015], Maceira et al. [2015], and Collado et al. [2017]). The reason that the
risk-averse MDP (9) is often not taken to be the base model is due to its lack of practical
interpretability. The exception is when ρt = Et, in which case (9) is a standard risk-neutral
MDP whose objective is simply the expected cumulative cost. In the next section, we focus
on analyzing (9) and in Section 4, we bring the models together and study a specific notion
of compatibility between the two.
3 Structure of the Risk-Averse MDP
In this section, we state some structural properties of the risk-averse optimal policy and
the associated optimal value function. All proofs that are not included in the body of the
paper can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 (Convexity). Let s = (r, p) ∈ S be the state variable. The following state-
ments hold for every t and β: (i) xp+ V˜t,T (r+x, p |β) is convex in x on X (r), (ii) V˜t,T (s |β)
is convex in the resource r, and (iii) Vt,T (s |β) is convex in the resource r.
The optimal value function also satisfies a monotonicity property, as shown in the fol-
lowing lemma.
Proposition 2 (Monotonicity). For every t and resource level r ∈ R\{Rmax}, the optimal
value function Vt,T (r, p |β) is increasing in the spot price p.
We now prove that the optimal policy is of the so called basestock or order-up-to type.
In this result, the thresholds are given as a function of the risk parameters β and the spot
price.
Theorem 2 (Optimal Policy). For each time t < T and spot price p, there exists a threshold
resource level rt,T (p |β) such that the optimal policy takes the following form:
xt,T (r, p |β) = min{rt,T (p |β)− r, xmax}1{r≤ rt,T (p |β)},
where rt,T (p |β) is the smallest value of r˜ that minimizes the quantity r˜ p+ V˜t,T (r˜, p |β).
Sketch of Proof: The proof is standard and follows from convexity of the value function (i.e.,
Proposition 1) along with the fact that the risk measure is coherent (and thus, convex).
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Our next goal is to analyze how p influences the threshold rt,T (p |β). We are able to
show that if the compensation function γY is “not too sensitive” to the spot price, then the
charging thresholds are nonincreasing in the spot price (matching our intuition in that we
should charge less when the prices are high). The sensitivty is formalized by the following
Lipschitz condition.
Assumption 1. The market-dependent compensation function γY is positive, increasing,
and LγY -Lipschitz continuous where it holds that LγY ≤ p−1ref e2κY .
Remark 1. If this assumption is not satisfied, then it is possible to observe strange (i.e.,
non-monotonic) behavior in the thresholds as a function of price. Note that the value of
one unit of charge at the time of customer arrival is governed by γY . Roughly speaking, the
marginal cost we should consider is of the form “current price−γY (price deviation at T + 1).”
Assumption 1 limits the sensitivity of the marginal cost function contributed by γY .
Before moving on to the theorem, we develop some notation and state a few technical
lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Lipschitz in Spot Price). If Assumption 1 holds, then for any t and r, the value
function Vt,T (r, · |β) is Lipschitz continuous in the price dimension.
Lemma 2 (Differentiability of Value at Risk). For every resource state r ∈ R \ {Rmax},
the value at risk function vt,T (r, p |β) = VaRαt [Vt+1,T (r, p e−κY + ψt+1 |β)] is differentiable
for almost every spot price p.
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 imply that both Vt,T (r, · |β) and vt,T (r, · |β) are differentiable
almost everywhere. It is reasonable for us to remove a null set of non-differentiability (call
it V) from the sample space under consideration for the remainder of the paper, i.e., those
ω ∈ Ω where Vt,T (r, Pt(ω) |β) or vt,T (r, · |β) are not differentiable. Considering only Ω \ V
simplifies the discussion in the paper; it is reasonable to do so because P(Pt ∈ V) = 0 for
any t (the price process Pt is a continuous random variable and exogenous to the decision
process).
Lemma 3 (Differentiating under the Risk Measure). Suppose the value function Vt+1,T ( · |β)
is differentiable at r = r0 ∈ R\{Rmax}. Then, we may differentiate under the risk measure
in the following sense:
∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) |r=r0 = (1− λ) E
[
∂rVt+1,T (r, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β)
] |r=r0
+ λE
[
∂rVt+1,T (r, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β) |ψt+1 ≥ VaRαt(ψt+1)
] |r=r0 .
With these lemmas in mind, we are able to show that the charging thresholds obey
monotonicity in the spot price, as formalized in the theorem below. Similar theorems for
the risk-neutral setting can be found in Secomandi [2010] and Chen et al. [2015]. Our
analysis extends these results (although under a different MDP model) to the risk-averse
setting by utilizing the preceding lemmas.
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Theorem 3 (Nonincreasing Threshold in Spot Price). Under Assumption 1, the threshold
rt,T (p |β) is nonincreasing in the spot price p for any degree of dynamic risk-aversion β.
Remark 2. Theorem 3 is proven here for a spot price model that contains mean-reversion,
seasonality, and jumps, three properties that are most appropriate for electricity spot prices.
However, we remark that the result can be adapted to other reasonable price models as
well. The crucial property used in the proof of Theorem 3 is that p − E[Pt+1 |Pt = p] is
nondecreasing in p. For example, our framework can incorporate general models of the
form Pt+1 = ζ
1
t+1 Pt + ζ
2
t+1 for some random variables ζ
1
t+1 and ζ
2
t+1, under the condition
that E[ζ1t+1] ≤ 1. Several popular choices, e.g., AR(1), martingale, and i.i.d. noise terms
(along with any seasonality function), can be represented under this general model. Note
that Assumption 1 is specialized for the model given in (3) and would need to be altered
under a different spot price model.
4 Practical Risk Compatibility
The last section analyzes the risk-averse optimal policy under a given dynamic risk measure
ρ0,T ( · |β). This is a standard approach in papers that consider risk-averse models; see, e.g.,
Lin et al. [2015], Devalkar et al. [2016], where the structure of the risk-averse optimal policy
is explicitly characterized. However, in this section, we are interested in going one step
further and commenting on the protocol of Figure 2 in the context of our EV charging
problem. From this point of view, the risk-averse MDP model is simply a computational
tool used to generate candidate policies that are then evaluated under a practical risk metric
and a practical reward metric (the base model objectives). The motivation for doing so is
that directly optimizing the practical risk and reward objectives can be computationally
difficult, while the risk-averse MDP enjoys a dynamic programming decomposition.
4.1 Defining Risk Compatibility
When pi = piT (β), we will use the convenient shorthand S
β
T = S
pi
T for the vector of visited
states. We are interested in defining a notion of compatibility between the potentially
divergent views of the problem. A new version of Figure 2 updated with mathematical
notation is given in Figure 4. Before continuing, we need to first define the notion of “more
risk-aversion.”
Definition 1 (Degree of Dynamic Risk-Aversion). Consider two dynamic risk measures
ρ0,T and ρ0,T
′. If ρ0,T (C) ≤ ρ0,T ′(C) for any cost sequence C, then ρ0,T ′ is more risk-averse
than ρ0,T .
To give a concrete example in the single period case, Belles-Sampera et al. [2014] points
out that when CVaR is used instead of VaR in the financial industry (note that VaRα(X) ≤
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Figure 4: Evaluation using Practical Metrics of Risk and Reward
CVaRα(X) for any cost X), then considerably higher capital reserves are required to offset
the risk. It is thus reasonable to say that CVaRα is more risk-averse than VaRα.
Definition 2 (Practical Risk Compatibility). Let the dynamic risk measure be parameter-
ized by β that varies within some set B. Suppose that there is a partial order ≤ on B such
that for β ≤ β′, the dynamic risk measure ρ0,T ( · |β′) is more risk-averse than ρ0,T ( · |β).
We say that ρ0,T ( · |β) has the property of practical compatibility on B with respect to f−T ( · )
if the mapping β → f−T (SβT ) is nonincreasing for any T .
A consequence of this definition is that β → ρbase[f−τ (Sβτ )] is nonincreasing. In other
words, compatibility means that “more risk-aversion” in the dynamic risk measure sense
should lead to lower risk in the practical sense as well. If, for example, more risk-aversion
leads to higher practical risk, then we may conclude that the risk-averse MDP is incom-
patible with our practical objective and choose an alternative optimization procedure. The
partial order for determining the degree of dynamic risk-aversion (in the sense of Definition
1) is generally easy to determine; for instance, CVaRα(X) is interpreted as more risk-averse
as α increases [Chen et al., 2009], and (1− λ) E(X) + λCVaRα(X) is more risk-averse as λ
increases [Philpott and de Matos, 2012].
Note that the notion of compatibility depends on many factors: we must first define the
dynamic risk measure ρ0,T ( · |β), the parameter set B along with the partial order ≤, and
the practical risk metric. Hence, for any given problem, we may observe compatibility in
some cases and incompatibility in others (incompatibility refers to the situation when there
are regions of B when the mapping β → ρbase [f−τ (Sβτ )] increases). An example can be found
in Maceira et al. [2015], where it was observed that increasing risk-aversion in the dynamic
risk measure unexpectedly increased the practical risk (energy not supplied):
It is possible to see that for some combinations of parameters [α and λ] both
operation cost and EENS [energy not supplied] increase simultaneously. Even
though we expect higher operation costs when applying the CVaR mechanism,
an increase in the EENS caused by preventive load curtailment is not desirable.
Therefore, we call the region containing such combinations as “undesirable re-
gion.” On the other hand, there are combinations of parameters that provide
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results located in a desirable area, i.e., cases where the operation cost increases
and the EENS decreases.
Given that the system in Maceira et al. [2015] was operationalized in Brazil, the issue of
compatibility is a critical one. Another example of incompatibility can be observed in Figure
11 of Shapiro et al. [2013]. A stylized illustration of these examples is given in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Illustration of Practical (In)compatibility
4.2 Compatibility Results
In the remainder of this section, we state and prove several risk compatibility properties
under the condition that for any T , the function f−T (S
pi
T ) is componentwise nonincreasing in
the resource states RpiT = (R
pi
0 , R
pi
1 , . . . , R
pi
T ), a condition we refer to as resource-monotonicity.
In other words, more energy in the vehicle corresponds to lower practical risk. Although
we did not require resource-monotonicity when introducing practical risk metrics (in the
interest of potential generalizations to other models), the inherent trade-offs associated with
the “charging versus waiting” decision studied in the dynamic charging problem necessitate
this property. We start with an important lemma.
Lemma 4 (Decreasing Marginal Value in Price). Under Assumption 1, the pre-decision and
post-decision marginal value of energy, ∂rVt,T (r, p |β) and ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β), are nonincreasing
in the spot price p for any fixed risk-aversion β.
We remind the reader that in the proof of Theorem 3, we showed that p+∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β)
is nondecreasing in p. The combined effect with the above lemma implies that ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β)
cannot decrease too quickly, but is nonincreasing nonetheless. Leveraging this lemma, we
are able to show our first compatibility result for the case when the dynamic risk measure
is parameterized by β0 = (λ0, α0). Recall that we described two parameter regimes, the
general charging regime where xmax is unrestricted and the fast charging regime where xmax
is larger than Rmax.
Theorem 4 (Compatibility in General Charging Regime). Fix any reservation horizon T
and the risk-aversion β∗−0 = (λ∗1, α∗1, . . . , λ∗T , α
∗
T ) for all periods except the first. Let
B(β∗−0) = {β = (λ0, α0, λ∗1, α∗1, . . . , λ∗T , α∗T ) : λ0 ∈ [0, 1], α0 ∈ (0, 1)}
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be the set of risk-aversion parameters where (λt, αt) matches (λ
∗
t , α
∗
t ) of β
∗−0 while the risk-
aversion in the first period is a “free parameter.” Taking the partial order ≤ to be the
componentwise inequality on R2 gives compatibility on the set B(β∗−0) between ρ0,T ( · |β)
and any resource-monotone f−T .
We remark that the above compatibility result requires a very specific parameterization
of the dynamic risk measure where only the initial risk-aversion parameters are free. This
restrictive parameterization is not ideal in that it limits the decision-maker to a small set
of risk-averse policies. A key takeaway from Theorem 4 and its narrow scope highlights the
delicate nature of the practical risk compatibility question.
Interestingly, we now show in Theorem 5 that compatibility can be shown with a fully
general parameterization of the dynamic risk measure if we focus only on the fast charging
regime, where Rmax ≤ xmax. We include the proof of the theorem here in order to comment
on the critical differences between the fast charging regime and the general regime described
in Theorem 4 (see Section 4.3).
Theorem 5 (Compatibility in Fast Charging Regime). Fix any reservation horizon T and
consider the fully general risk-aversion parameter set
B = {β : λt ∈ [0, 1], αt ∈ (0, 1), t = 0, 1, . . . , T}
of risk-aversion parameters. Let the partial order ≤ be the componentwise inequality on RT .
Then, compatibility holds on the set B between ρ0,T ( · |β) and any resource-monotone f−T .
Proof. Consider the risk-aversion parameters β, β′ ∈ B where
β = (λ0, α0, . . . , λT , αT ) ≤ (λ′0, α′0, . . . , λ′T , α′T ) = β′.
Suppose that rt,T (p |β) ≤ rt,T (p |β′) for any spot price p and time t. If this is true, then since
the thresholds (i.e., charging “targets”) are higher for every t, it follows that RβT ≤ Rβ
′
T .
Therefore, threshold monotonicity rt,T (p |β) ≤ rt,T (p |β′) is a sufficient condition for the
compatibility criterion f−T (S
β′
T ) ≤ f−T (SβT ).
Our goal for the remainder of this proof is to show that the marginal value of energy
decreases as risk-aversion increases: ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) ≥ ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β′). This would imply the
desired condition rt,T (p |β) ≤ rt,T (p |β′), from which the reasoning above can be applied to
complete the argument.
Base Case. We proceed via backward induction, starting with the base case of t = T − 1.
First, note that γY is positive by Assumption 1 and ρβT is nondecreasing in βT . The
derivative
∂rVt+1,T (r, p e
−κY + ψt+1 | |beta)
= −pref
[
1 + 2γh h(r) + ρβT [γY ((p e
−κY + ψt+1) e−κY + ψt+1,Y )]
]
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is thus nonincreasing in βT . Next, by Lemma 4 and the fact that VaRαT−1(ψT ) is increasing
in αT−1, it follows that the mapping
αT−1 7→ E
[
∂rVT,T (r, p e
−κY + ψT |β) |ψT ≥ VaRαT−1(ψT )
]
is nonincreasing. Hence, we have
∂rV˜T−1,T (r, p |β) = (1− λT−1) E
[
∂rVT,T (r, p e
−κY + ψT |β)
]
+ λT−1 E
[
∂rVT,T (r, p e
−κY + ψT |β) |ψT ≥ VaRαT−1(ψT )
]
≥ (1− λ′T−1) E
[
∂rVT,T (r, p e
−κY + ψT |β′)
]
+ λ′T−1 E
[
∂rVT,T (r, p e
−κY + ψT |β′) |ψT ≥ VaRα′T−1(ψT )
]
= ∂rV˜T−1,T (r, p |β′),
completing the base case. The induction hypothesis is ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) ≥ ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β′) and
we will verify that the same statement holds when t− 1 replaces t.
Inductive Step. Let P = p e−κY + ψt. We now consider the value function at time t
evaluated at P (i.e., from the perspective of time t− 1):
Vt,T (r, p |β) = xt,T (r, p |β) · P − cf + V˜t,T (r + xt,T (r, p |β), P |β), (12)
and as a first step, we aim to show that ∂rVt,T (r, p |β) ≥ ∂rVt,T (r, P |β′). Since we are in
the fast charging regime, the optimal policy at time t is to either charge (all the way) up
to the threshold rt,T (p |β) or do nothing if the charge level is already above rt,T (p |β). We
define the price sets
Plow(r, β) = {P : r ≤ rt,T (p |β)} and Phigh(r, β) = {P : rt,T (p |β) < r}.
Due to rt,T (p |β) being nonincreasing in p, these price sets are disjoint and monotone in
the sense that any element of Plow(r, β) is no greater than any element of Phigh(r, β).
Previously, in the proof of Theorem 3 (in Appendix A), the risk-aversion was fixed so
the price sets did not need to explicitly depend on β; however, now that we are studying
the impact of risk-aversion, it is crucial to analyze this dependence. See Figure 6 for an
illustration of the price sets: the two horizontal axes represent the price P and the vertical
axis is the resource value r. The diagram shows that (by the induction hypothesis) the
charging threshold rt,T (p |β) at t is nondecreasing as we move from β (the black curve) to
β′ (the red curve). This, in turn, alters the low and high price sets shown on the bottom
horizontal axis for β (in black) and the top horizontal axis for β′ (in red).
Doing casework on each of the spot price intervals, we can rewrite (12) for a fixed r as
a piecewise function of P :
Vt,T (r, p |β) =
(rt,T (p |β)− r) · P − cf + V˜t,T (rt,T (p |β), P |β) if P ∈Plow(r, β),−cf + V˜t,T (r, P |β) if P ∈Phigh(r, β).
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Figure 6: Illustration of the Price Sets for the Fast Charging Case
Differentiating in the resource r, we obtain
∂rVt,T (r, p |β) =
−P if P ∈Plow(r, β),∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) if P ∈Phigh(r, β). (13)
As shown in Figure 6, when comparing β and β′, there are three cases (I, II, and III) that
we need to consider. In Case I, we have P ∈Plow(r, β)∩Plow(r, β′) and it is clear by (13)
that ∂rVt,T (r, p |β) = ∂rVt,T (r, P |β′) = −P . Case III is similarly straightforward because
when P ∈Phigh(r, β) ∩Phigh(r, β′), we know that by the induction hypothesis
∂rVt,T (r, p |β) = ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) ≥ ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β′) = ∂rVt,T (r, P |β′).
Now let us move to Case II, when P ∈ Phigh(r, β) ∩Plow(r, β′). Observe the following
important property whenever P ∈ Phigh(r, β) = {P : rt,T (p |β) < r}. As characterized
in Theorem 2, the threshold r˜ = rt,T (p |β) minimizes the quantity r˜ P + V˜t,T (r˜, p |β). By
convexity of r˜ P + V˜t,T (r˜, p |β) in r˜ (Proposition 1), it follows that the derivative P +
∂rV˜t,T (r˜, p |β) evaluated at some r˜ > rt,T (p |β) must be nonnegative. Hence, we have for
Case II:
∂rVt,T (r, p |β) = ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) ≥ −P = ∂rVt,T (r, P |β′)
which completes the argument that ∂rVt,T (r, p |β) ≥ ∂rVt,T (r, P |β′) for any P . Because r
was arbitrarily fixed, the inequality holds for any r as well. To finish the inductive step,
i.e. ∂rV˜T−1,T (r, p |β) ≥ ∂rV˜T−1,T (r, p |β′), the proof of the base case can be essentially
repeated.
4.3 Incompatibilty
What goes wrong in the slow charging case if we wish to employ the fully general B from
Theorem 5? As with logic introduced in the proof of Theorem 3 in Appendix A (see
Figure 15), extending the analysis of Theorem 5 to the slow charging case also requires the
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definition of three price sets: Plow(r, β) = {P : r + xmax < rt,T (p |β)}, Pmed(r, β) = {P :
r ≤ rt,T (p |β) ≤ r + xmax}, and Phigh(r, β) = {P : rt,T (p |β) < r}.
r
Plow(r,β) Phigh(r,β)
Phigh(r,β′)Plow(r,β′)
I II III
Pmed(r,β)
Pmed(r,β′)
IV V
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rt,T (P |β)
rt,T (P |β′)
Figure 7: Illustration of the Price Sets for the Slow Charging Case
In Figure 7, we illustrate a situation where Phigh(r, β) ∩ Plow(r, β′) 6= ∅; this re-
gion is denoted “III.” The two quantities that we need to compare in this region to show
∂rVt,T (r, p |β) ≥ ∂rVt,T (r, P |β′) are ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) and ∂rV˜t,T (r + xmax, P |β′) — unfortu-
nately, it is not necessarily true that the former is greater than the latter. Note, however,
that Case I, II, IV, and V have the correct inequality. One can confirm via numerical
experiments that incompatibility over B in the slow charging case indeed exists.
5 Selecting the Degree of Dynamic Risk-Aversion
So far, we have studied the dynamic EV charging problem along two dimensions: (1)
we provide an in-depth characterization on the structure of the optimal policy for a fixed
degree of risk-aversion β in Section 3, and (2) we consider varying β and analyze the issue
of compatibility between optimal policies of risk-averse MDPs (specified under a dynamic
risk measure built by nesting mean-CVaR) and resource-monotone practical risk metrics
in Section 4. Now that the approach shown in Figures 2 and 4 has been justified (to an
extent) by the theorems of Section 4, one question still remains: how do we select β so that
the optimal risk-averse MDP policy performs “well” under the base model?
As we previously discussed, the current practice is to heuristically select a large batch of
potential β’s, solve a large number of MDPs, simulate a large number of resulting policies,
and then choose one that provides an acceptable trade-off (see, e.g., Maceira et al. [2015]).
Unfortunately, this heuristic tuning method requires significant computational resources,
negating the original motivation to solve practical reward versus risk problem via the sim-
ple and computationally effective dynamic programming approach (refer to Figure 2). In
addition to CPU time, another weakness of the heuristic tuning approach is that the final
choice of β must be from the pre-selected batch.
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We now propose a simple approximation procedure that mitigates these issues. It uti-
lizes structural information from our compatibility results so that β can be selected in a
more principled manner. Suppose that we are given practical metrics rbase [f
+
τ (S
pi
τ )] and
ρbase [f
−
τ (S
pi
τ )], along with a set B¯ ⊆ B and ≤ that are compatible with f−T for all T . Given
a “trade-off parameter” ε, our goal is to search for some β ∈ B¯ such that the practical risk
ρbase [f
−
τ (S
β
τ )] ≤ ε while rbase [f+τ (Spiτ )] is maximized; see the formulation given in (6).
Step 1 (Solve MDPs). Sample a small set of risk-aversion parameters {β1, β2, . . . , βn} and
solve the associated MDPs for each T . For every i, use simulation to obtain estimates
yi ≈ rbase [f+τ (Sβ
i
τ )] and zi ≈ ρbase [f−τ (Sβ
i
τ )].
Step 2 (Structured Regression). Utilize the “datasets” of practical reward/risk versus β
{(β1, y1), (β2, y2), . . . , (βn, yn)} and {(β1, z1), (β2, z2), . . . , (βn, zn)}
to construct regression models rˆbase(β) and ρˆbase(β) that respectively approximate the
practical reward and risk incurred by the MDP policies specified by β. Leverage the
structural compatibility result to complement the regression procedure (see below).
Step 3 (Policy Selection). Use the models rˆbase(β) and ρˆbase(β) to find a parameter βˆ such
that the practical reward rˆbase(βˆ) is maximized while the practical risk is constrained:
ρˆbase(βˆ) ≤ ε. Solve the MDPs associated with βˆ and implement the policy.
The main idea of Step 2 is to take advantage of Theorems 4 and 5 and employ a form
of structured regression to ensure that ρˆbase(β) is nonincreasing in β. Many monotone
regression techniques are specified only for the one dimensional case [Mukerjee, 1988, Dette
et al., 2006], but following the general idea given in Ahmadi and Majumdar [2014] for convex
regression, if we restrict ρˆbase to take the form of a polynomial, then the monotonicity
constraints can be approximated with sum of squares (SOS) constraints. The resulting
problem, for an l1 error function, can be solved efficiently using semi-definite programming
[Parrilo, 2003]. For example, suppose we are using the set B¯ = {β : (λ, α) = β0 = β1 = · · · =
βT }, the set of risk parameters that are time-independent. This set can be parameterized
by two scalars, λ and α. Letting βi = (λi, αi), the structured regression problem is:
minimize
poly ρˆbase
n∑
i=1
| rˆbase(λi, αi)− zi
∣∣
subject to − ∂λ rˆbase(λ, α), −∂α rˆbase(λ, α) are SOS.
We illustrate this procedure using numerical experiments in Section 6.
6 Numerical Results and Case Study
In this section, we investigate our results on a realistic instance of the problem in the
presence of a DC fast charging station (e.g., the ones described in Section 1 by Tesla and
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ChargePoint). Specifically, we empirically verify the structural results of Theorem 2 and
Theorem 3, in addition to the compatibility result (for the fast charging case) of Theorem
5. We then show the effectiveness of the risk-averse MDP selection procedure described in
Section 5. The stochastic models of the price process {Pt} and the reservation length τ are
informed by market data from CAISO and parking garage inventory data from the city of
Santa Monica, California.
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Figure 8: Seasonality Function g(t) and Average (Across Time) Prices
6.1 Stochastic Model & Problem Parameters
The spot market in our model is based on a dataset from the CAISO fifteen minute market
(the BAYSHOR2_1_N001 node) during the winter period December 1, 2016 to February 28,
2017. Since our problem is at the time scale of a few hours at most, we are primarily
interested in understanding the intra-day seasonality. To accomplish this, for each 15 minute
period during the day, we compute the average price across all weekdays in the dataset and
then fit a sinusoidal function (with a period of one day) to the resulting time series; see
Figure 8. The estimated seasonality function is given by
g(t) = 13.586 sin(2pit/48)− 0.7597 cos(2pit/48) + 34.1362,
where t measured in units of 15 minutes.
After removing the seasonality, we used maximum likelihood estimation to find the
parameters of the Yt stochastic process, resulting in µY = −0.492, κY = 0.341, σY = 5.350,
µJ = −0.484, σJ = 40.602, and λ = 0.131. Figure 9 provides a comparison between actual
and fitted prices that includes both g(t) and Yt.
Although we do not have access to EV charging reservation data, we examined a large
dataset4 of parking space availability in public parking garages of Santa Monica, California
(updated one every five minutes). An analysis of the changes in parking garage availability
over time across 14 parking garages and one year of five minute data from May 2016 to April
2017 (nearly 1.5 million records) provided us a estimated distribution for τ . Observations
4Santa Monica Open Data, https://data.smgov.net/Transportation/Parking-Lot-Counts/ng8m-khuz
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Figure 9: Actual and Simulated Spot Prices
of “parking time” were computed by first identifying times of peak utilization (i.e., the
local maximums) and then analyzing the rate at which the garage empties. For example,
if the garage empties quickly approximately one hour after the peak, then this suggests
that many vehicles are parked for a length of one hour. The process yielded over 700,000
“parking observations” which were then used to estimate a distribution; see the second
panel of Figure 10. The first panel of Figure 10 shows a one month sample of the raw data
from the parking utilization dataset. It is interesting to note that a significant portion of
parking garage patrons park for around 1.25 hours.
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Figure 10: Raw Parking Garage Data & Estimated Distribution of Reservation Length τ
The initial price is chosen to be P0 = $35/MWh (we follow the convention of wholesale
electricity prices being written in units of MWh−1 even though our setting is on the order
of KWh) and the battery is assumed to be initially empty: R0 = 0. The capacity of the
battery is Rmax = 60 kWh, in line with the entry version of the Tesla Model S from 2012
to 2015. This is a reasonable choice for a medium sized battery, as there are both EVs
with smaller capacities (e.g., Nissan Leaf or BMW i3) and EVs with larger capacities (e.g.,
newer and higher end Tesla models). We set the charging fee to be cf = $2.00/hour. The
parameters related to the inconvenience compensation are taken to be pref = $0.05/kWh,
γh = 0.01, and γY (y) = log(1 + exp(y)) (a smooth version of max(0, y)), where y is in units
of $/kWh.
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6.2 Exact MDP Results
In order to properly solve the risk-averse MDPs, discretization is necessary. We use the
method of Roy [2003] to discretize ψt+1 to only contain integer outcomes and we ignore the
outcomes that occur with probability less than 1.5 · 10−3. Such a discretization gives us
260 distinct spot prices allows us to utilize the linear programming method for computing
the CVaR, as pointed out in Rockafellar and Uryasev [2000]. The resource state is also
discretized so that Rt takes values in {0, 1, . . . , Rmax}. Each MDP contains approximately
16,000 states per time period, leading to 270,000 total states when τ = 16.
We consider the risk-aversion set B¯ = {β : (λ, α) = β0 = β1 = · · · = βT }. To adequately
explore B¯, we solve a total of 4,953 MDPs for parameter values of λ ∈ {0, 0.05, . . . , 1},
α ∈ {0.05, 0.1, . . . , 0.95}, and T ∈ {4, 5, . . . , 16}. Computing the solution to this set of MDPs
requires a massive amount of computation and we do it only to illustrate the structural
properties of the problem. This step is not necessary in practice, as we will see in Section
6.3 that the approximation approach described in Section 5 is quite effective.
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Figure 11: Thresholds for λ = 0.5, T = 16
We report our results using Figures 11 and 12. In Figure 11, we plot the thresholds
as a function of price for a fixed λ = 0.5. Each curve represents a different value of α,
which range from 0.05 to 0.95 (darker means higher α value). This serves to experimentally
verify the statement of Theorem 3, that the thresholds are nonincreasing in p. Moreover,
it verifies that the thresholds are nondecreasing in α, as shown in the proof of Theorem 5.
We notice that at the for a given degree of risk-aversion, a $30 change in spot price can
alter the threshold by Rmax = 60.
Figure 12 fixes the spot price p and displays the variation of the threshold as a function
of β (again, the thresholds are nondecreasing by Theorem 5) for the MDP associated with
T = 16. We see that the degree of risk-aversion (λ, α) can dramatically change the policy:
in the risk-neutral case for p = 25, the threshold rt,T (p |β) ≈ 20, while in the most risk-
averse case, rt,T (p |β) ≈ 60 = Rmax (meaning we should charge as much as possible). This
observation emphasizes the importance of selecting an appropriate value for β, which we
discuss in the next section.
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(A) Thresholds for p = 25, t = 16 (B) Thresholds for p = 30, t = 16
Figure 12: Behavior of Thresholds for Fixed p
6.3 Selecting β using Approximation
One way to choose β would be to compute and simulate a large batch of risk-averse policies
corresponding to different values of β, similar to what is shown in Figure 12 and the refer-
ences discussed in Section 1. As discussed in Section 5, this heuristic tuning method suffers
from two major drawbacks: (1) it can be very computationally intense, due to the large
number of β’s that needs to be explored, and (2) the final choice of β necessarily comes
from the pre-selected batch. For instance, a MATLAB implementation on two 14 core, 3.3
GHz Intel Haswell CPUs requires 2.5 minutes for each instance of β (i.e., 13 MDPs with
different horizons T ). Solving these MDPs for 381 combinations of λ and α thus requires
nearly 16 hours of CPU time (or without parallelization, days of CPU time).
We now illustrate the alternative approach that was outlined in Section 5, wherein a
small sample of β’s are chosen as “observations” that are fed into a structured regression
model to estimate the practical reward and risk over the entire set B¯. We assume that the
practical reward is given by (5), the negative of the total expected cost. Let δ = 0.3 and
suppose the practical risk is given by
ρbase [f
−
τ (S
pi
τ )] = E
[
1{Rτ/Rmax≤ (1−δ)}
]
= P(Rτ/Rmax ≤ (1− δ)),
the probability that the vehicle is less than 70% charged.5 Let ε ∈ [0, 1] be the “trade-
off parameter.” We consider the case where the decision maker aims to solve the practical
problem (6) by appealing to the framework described in Figure 2 and searching over policies
pi that optimize some instance of the risk-averse MDP (similar to what is done in Maceira
et al. [2015]). We proceed with the three steps outlined in Section 5.
Step 1. We let {β1, β2, . . . , βn} be all combinations of λ ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1} and α ∈
{0.05, 0.15, . . . , 0.95}. The corresponding MDPs are solved and the policies are simulated
N = 100,000 times to obtain estimates of the practical reward and risk. Note that we are
5We choose 70% because a charge of around 80% is usually considered an adequate charge. For example,
Tesla states that “charging above 80% isn’t typically necessary” at http://www.tesla.com/supercharger.
28
using a coarser grid than before to save computation time, allowing the regression procedure
to fill in the blanks.
Step 2. We elect to use a polynomial representation for rˆbase(β) and ρˆbase(β), so that
rˆbase(β) = w
T
Γ φ(λ, α) and ρˆbase(β) = w
T
Ψ φ(λ, α),
where wΓ and wΨ are the weight vectors and φ(λ, α) is the vector of all degree 10 monomials
(66 terms).
(A) Approximated Practical Reward rˆbase (B) Approximated Practical Risk ρˆbase
Figure 13: Practical Reward and Risk Metrics using Regression
Using the SPOT toolbox [Megretski, 2013] and the MOSEK solver, we carried out an
l1 regression procedure to compute the coefficients wΓ,wΨ — as mentioned in Section 5,
sum-of-squares constraints [Ahmadi and Majumdar, 2014, 2015] are used to compute wΨ
to enforce the compatibility result of Theorem 5. The regression procedure requires roughly
four seconds of CPU time (2 seconds for the reward and 2 seconds for the risk).
Figure 13 shows our estimated practical metric surface over β ∈ B¯ along with the metrics
associated with the sample set of MDPs as red dots. In particular, we point out that the
policy obtained by solving the risk-neutral (RN) MDP, i.e., when λ = 0, generates a profit
of $11.30, but leaves the EV inadequately charged 65.5% of the time.6 This level of risk
would not be acceptable in practical settings.
Step 3. In the final step of the procedure, we use the approximations wΓ,wΨ to select a
choice of β. Specifically, we solve the problem
maximizeβ∈ [0,1]×(0,1) rˆbase(β) subject to ρˆbase(β) ≤ ε,
where the maximizer is denoted βˆ(ε) = (λˆ(ε), αˆ(ε)). This can be thought of as a “rec-
ommended degree of risk-aversion” for the particular level of ε. The policy selected for
eventual implementation is pi
βˆ(ε)
τ — the optimal policy with respect to the risk-averse MDP
specified using βˆ(ε). Of course, the solution βˆ(ε) is generally not one of the sampled points,
6One may point out that surely we could change the inconvenience compensation scheme to mitigate
this behavior. However, the idea of risk-averse optimization is to take the “physical characteristics” of the
problem as given (i.e., fix the current compensation scheme) and produce risk-averse policies.
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i.e., βˆ(ε) 6∈ {β1, β2, . . . , βn}, so the final step before implementation is to solve the MDPs
associated with βˆ(ε). The recommended βˆ(ε) and the practical reward and risk of the asso-
ciated optimal policies for ten reasonable values for ε, ranging from 0.01 to 0.10, are shown
in Table 1. The table also provides a comparison to the default policy (charge continuously)
and the optimal risk-neutral (RN) solution, which we have given in the first and last rows,
respectively.
Trade-off ε λˆ(ε) αˆ(ε) Reward (% of RN) Risk (% of RN)
Default - - $1.90 (16.8%) 0.000 (0.0%)
0.01 0.937 0.914 $2.74 (24.3%) 0.002 (0.3%)
0.02 0.876 0.901 $2.85 (25.3%) 0.009 (1.3%)
0.03 0.827 0.896 $2.97 (26.3%) 0.019 (2.9%)
0.04 0.793 0.891 $3.11 (27.5%) 0.033 (5.0%)
0.05 0.761 0.888 $3.25 (28.8%) 0.041 (6.2%)
0.06 0.747 0.881 $3.39 (30.0%) 0.054 (8.2%)
0.07 0.715 0.881 $3.52 (31.2%) 0.068 (10.4%)
0.08 0.681 0.883 $3.66 (32.4%) 0.072 (10.9%)
0.09 0.669 0.878 $3.80 (33.7%) 0.090 (13.7%)
0.10 0.61 0.89 $3.94 (34.9%) 0.095 (14.5%)
RN - - $11.30 (100.0%) 0.655 (100.0%)
Table 1: Practical Reward and Risk of the Recommended Risk-Aversion Levels
Next, we show in Figure 14 the path of βˆ(ε) = (λˆ(ε), αˆ(ε)) as ε varies from 0.05 up to 0.6
(since we know that the RN solution incurs a practical risk of 0.655). Note that this figure
is purely for methodological interest, as it is unlikely that ε values greater than 0.10 would
be useful in practice. Although approximations from the regression are used to create the
path of β, Figure 14 suggests that the relationship between (6) and the risk-averse MDP
policies is complex and that there may not a structure that is simple to discern. Additional
research in this area is needed.
ε = 0.05
ε = 0.60
ε = 0.15
ε = 0.50
ε = 0.25
Figure 14: The Path of βˆ
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7 Insights and Discussion
Our problem focuses on dynamic EV charging in the presence of a reservation system.
However, “dynamic EV charging” may occur under various other related settings and system
designs, and we believe that the results from our study apply there as well. Examples of
these related problems are given below, along with a commentary on how our model can be
extended to these settings.
– In a first-come, first-served EV charging station without reservations, the control
system may attempt to “guess” at the return time of the customer and attempt
to delay charging to reduce costs. In this model, the distribution of τ (the customer
arrival time) is incorporated into the MDP, while in our current model, the distribution
of τ defines multiple instances of the MDP.
– When a charging station has multiple ports that share the same power source (see, e.g.,
ChargePoint Express Plus and ChargePoint Power Cube), it is necessary to decrease
the power output when additional vehicles join, creating the possibility that vehicles
are not charged up to the customers’ expectations. Our model can be extended to
this case by specifying a pre-determined rule for how power capacity should be split
between vehicles; for example, in the interest of fairness, the rule could be that the
power is always split evenly. Our model could then be applied independently at each
port with the addition that the charging capacity xmax is now a random variable (that
decreases whenever additional vehicles are plugged into the station and increases when
vehicles leave).
– Vehicle-to-grid systems take advantage of the storage capacity of idle electric vehicles,
allowing them to provide ancillary services to the grid in times of need [Rotering and
Ilic, 2011]. For our model to handle this case, we would allow the charging decision
xt to take both postive and negative values (negative values represent the delivery of
energy to the grid).
A common thread of the above is that the customer is potentially disappointed when the
charge level is inadequate at the time of use. Compensation for the inconvenience, in
whatever form, monetary or otherwise, should then be provided. In this paper, we show an
example where, under a reasonable compensation scheme, the optimal risk-neutral policy to
the dynamic EV charging problem leaves the vehicle inadequately charged nearly two-thirds
of the time. This suggests that for the broader class of dynamic EV charging problems,
simply optimizing with respect to the expected total cost under any given inconvenience
compensation scheme may produce undesirable policies.
One may point out that a trade-off between charging costs and “risk” (in the form of the
compensation) is already being made in the risk-neutral problem. This is true to an extent;
the issue is that trade-off induced by these competing costs is, in some sense, misaligned, as
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the firm cannot implement a policy that provides an inadequate charge 65.5% of the time.
Thus, the question is: if we take the physical characteristics of the problem as fixed (i.e.,
we do not re-write the compensation scheme), then how can we produce a policy that is
more risk-averse? The introduction of risk measures provides an additional lever to “tip the
scales” when the cost function itself provides an incorrect trade-off (utility functions are
another approach). By implementing our risk-averse MDP/practical metrics approach on
our reservation-based EV charging model, we are able to discover policies with much more
reasonable trade-offs (see Table 1).
Most EV charging stations today use the default continuous charging policy, so it is
perhaps more informative for our results to be viewed from the point of view of this standard
practice. We see from Table 1 that if the manager of the charging station is willing to incur
a small risk of 0.002, then a dynamic charging policy can increase profits by 44% (from
$1.90 to $2.74). This suggests that EV charging stations can be operated at a significantly
higher level of profitability if dynamic charging is adopted.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we study EV charging in a setting where one attempts to exploit volatility
in the spot market by charging only when the prices are low. At the same time, the risk
of unsatisfied customers who may return to undercharged vehicles must be controlled. The
problem is specified as a risk-averse MDP formulated using a dynamic (nested) risk measure,
but we point out that the objective function has no practical interpretation. Our main
methodological contribution lies in formalizing a procedure wherein risk-averse MDPs are
used as a computational tool to produce policies that are evaluated using “practical” reward
and reward metrics (termed the base model). We define a notion of risk compatibility and
prove that under certain conditions, additional risk-aversion in the dynamic risk measure
sense leads to additional risk-aversion in the practical sense as well. Next, we propose an
approximation procedure that allows a decision-maker to easily search within a set of risk-
averse MDPs for a “practical policy” using a regression model on a few solved instances.
Finally, we provide numerical results based on real data that support the effectiveness of the
approximation procedure. The numerical experiments suggest that dynamic EV charging
can significantly improve the profitability of EV charging stations when a small amount of
risk is incurred.
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A Proofs
Proposition 1 (Convexity). Let s = (r, p) ∈ S be the state variable. The following state-
ments hold for every t and β: (i) xp+ V˜t,T (r+x, p |β) is convex in x on X (r), (ii) V˜t,T (s |β)
is convex in the resource r, and (iii) Vt,T (s |β) is convex in the resource r.
Proof. First note that Vt,T (s |β) is trivially convex in r. We let the induction hypothesis
be that Vt+1,T ( · |β)(s) is strictly convex in r, from which we can show (i), (ii), and (iii) for
t. For a feasible decision x ∈ X (r), let
Qt,T (s, x |β) = xp− cf + V˜t,T (r + x, p |β)
and Q = {(r, x) : x ∈ X (r), r ∈ R}. From the convexity of the mapping (r, x) 7→ Vt+1,T (r+
x, p e−κY + ψt+1 |β) on Q for each realization of ψt+1 and the convexity (in the space of
random variables) of ρβt , we obtain that
(r, x) 7→ V˜t,T (r + x, p |β) = ρβt
[
Vt+1,T (r + x, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β)
]
is convex on Q. This implies property (ii) and it follows that Qt,T (s, x |β) is convex in (r, x)
on Q, which verifies (i).
Since we can write Vt,T (s |β) = minx∈X (r)Qt,T (s, x |β) and X (r) is nonempty, the well-
known property that convexity is preserved under minimization can be applied; by [Heyman
and Sobel, 2003, Proposition B-4], Vt,T (s |β) is convex in r. This proves property (iii) and
we have completed the inductive step and also verified (i) and (ii) along the way.
Proposition 2 (Monotonicity). For every t and resource level r ∈ R\{Rmax}, the optimal
value function Vt,T (r, p |β) is increasing in the spot price p.
Proof. We first focus on monotonicity in p and proceed via induction. For each resource
state r ∈ R\{Rmax}, the function VT,T (s |β) is increasing in the spot price p by Assumption
1. This completes the base case. We assume the same is true for Vt+1,T (r, p |β) and complete
the inductive step by proving that the property holds for Vt,T (r, p |β). To do so, we consider
V˜t,T (r + x, p |β) = (1− λt) E
[
Vt+1,T (r + x, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β)
]
+ λt ct,T (r + x, p |β).
Since λ can take values of 0 or 1, we analyze both terms. By the induction hypothesis, the
terms within the expectation are increasing in p for every realization of ψt+1, so the first
term is increasing in p.
Now, we consider ct,T (r + x, p |β). Let p′ > p so that by the induction hypothesis, we
know there exists a deterministic ′ > 0 such that
Vt+1,T (r + x, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β) + ′ ≤ Vt+1,T (r + x, p′ e−κY + ψt+1 |β) a.s.
Hence, by the translation invariance and monotonicity axioms of coherent risk measures
Artzner et al. [1999], we have ct,T (r+ x, p |β) + ′ ≤ ct,T (r+ x, p′ |β). We have shown that
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V˜t,T (r + x, p |β) is increasing. Thus, xp− cf + V˜t,T (r + x, p |β) is increasing in p for every
x ∈ X (r), implying that Vt,T ( · |β) is too.
Theorem 2 (Optimal Policy). For each time t < T and spot price p, there exists a threshold
resource level rt,T (p |β) such that the optimal policy takes the following form:
xt,T (r, p |β) = min{rt,T (p |β)− r, xmax}1{r≤ rt,T (p |β)},
where rt,T (p |β) is the smallest value of r˜ that minimizes the quantity r˜ p+ V˜t,T (r˜, p |β).
Proof. To obtain an equivalent formulation of (11) in terms of the post-decision resource
state, we make a substitution r˜ = r + x and x = r˜ − r. Define R(r) = {r˜ : r ≤ r˜ ≤
min{r + xmax, Rmax}} as the set of possible post-decision resource levels. We have
xt,T (r, p |β) ∈
(
arg min
r˜∈R(r)
r˜ p+ V˜t,T (r˜, p |β)
)
− r. (14)
Note that the objective is convex in r˜ by Proposition 1. Since R(r) ⊆ R, consider the
solution rt(p |β) to the relaxed optimization problem
rt,T (p |β) ∈ arg min
r˜∈R
r˜ p+ V˜t,T (r˜, p |β). (15)
Clearly, if rt,T (p |β) ∈ R(r), then it is an optimal solution to the optimization prob-
lem within (14) and the optimal decision is rt,T (p |β) − r. There are two ways in which
rt,T (p |β) 6∈ R(r) can happen. First, if rt,T (p |β) < r, then by convexity, r˜ p+ V˜t,T (r˜, p |β)
is nondecreasing on R(r) and an optimal solution is r˜ = r, implying an optimal decision of
0. The second case is when r + xmax < rt,T (p |β) ≤ Rmax. Again, by convexity, it must be
true that r˜ p+ V˜t,T (r˜, p |β) is nonincreasing on R(r) and an optimal solution is r˜ = r+xmax.
This necessarily gives us an optimal decision of xmax. Finally, combining these three cases
allows us to conclude the structure of the optimal policy stated in the theorem.
Lemma 1 (Lipschitz in Spot Price). If Assumption 1 holds, then for any t and r, the value
function Vt,T (r, · |β) is Lipschitz continuous in the price dimension.
Proof. First, the terminal cost function
Vt,T (r, p |β) =
[
1 + γh ht(r) + ρβT [γY (p e
−κY + ψT+1,Y )]
]
ht(r) pref
is clearly Lipschitz in p for each r by Assumption 1 and the inequality |ρβt(A)− ρβt(B)| ≤
ρβt(|A − B|). For each fixed r, we denote the Lipschitz parameter by LVT,T |β(r) and then
let LVT,T |β= maxr∈R LVT,T |β(r). We now proceed by backward induction on t. Using the
inequality |min f −min g| ≤ max |f − g|, we have∣∣Vt,T (r, p |β)− Vt,T (r, p′ |β)∣∣ ≤ max
x∈X (r)
∣∣V˜t,T (r + x, p |β)− V˜t,T (r + x, p′ |β)∣∣. (16)
Using the definition of the post-decision value function and (4), we have
V˜t,T (r + x, p |β) = ρβt
[
Vt+1,T (r + x, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β)
]
.
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Again using the inequality |ρβt(A) − ρβt(B)| ≤ ρβt(|A − B|) along with (16), we conclude
that ∣∣Vt,T (r + x, p |β)− Vt,T (r + x, p′ |β)∣∣ ≤ e−κY LVt+1,T |β |p− p′|
for any r + x. Thus, we can set LVt,T |β = e
−κY LVt+1,T |β to complete the proof.
Lemma 2 (Differentiability of Value at Risk). For every resource state r ∈ R \ {Rmax},
the value at risk function vt,T (r, p |β) = VaRαt [Vt+1,T (r, p e−κY + ψt+1 |β)] is differentiable
for almost every spot price p.
Proof. We apply the simple property that value at risk is invariant under a monotone
transformation in the following sense. Consider a random variable X and an increasing
function l. Then, since P[X ≤ VaRαt(X)] = P[l(X) ≤ l(VaRαt(X))] = α, it follows that
VaRαt(l(X)) = l(VaRαt(X)). By the monotonicity property of Proposition 2, we have
vt,T (r, p |β) = VaRαt [Vt+1,T (r, p e−κY + ψt+1 |β)] = Vt+1,T (r, p e−κY + VaRαt(ψt+1) |β)
We conclude by noting that the Lipschitz property of Lemma 1 implies Vt+1,T (r, · |β) is
differentiable almost everywhere.
Lemma 3 (Differentiating under the Risk Measure). Suppose the value function Vt+1,T ( · |β)
is differentiable at r = r0 ∈ R\{Rmax}. Then, we may differentiate under the risk measure
in the following sense:
∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) |r=r0 = (1− λ) E
[
∂rVt+1,T (r, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β)
] |r=r0
+ λE
[
∂rVt+1,T (r, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β) |ψt+1 ≥ VaRαt(ψt+1)
] |r=r0 .
Proof. The first part of the equation is simply an interchange of differentiation and expec-
tation:
∂rE
[
V βt+1(r, p e
−κY + ψt+1)
]
= E
[
∂rV
β
t+1(r, p e
−κY + ψt+1)
]
.
By Proposition 1, V βt+1(r, p e
−κY + ψt+1) is Lipschitz on [0, Rmax] and thus the interchange
follows by the dominated convergence theorem. To show the second part, we first apply
[Hong and Liu, 2009, Theorem 3.1] to obtain
∂rCVaRαt [Vt+1,T (r, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β)] |r=r0
= E
[
∂rVt+1,T (r, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β) |Vt+1,T (r, p e−κY + ψt+1 |β) ≥ vt,α(r, p |β)
] |r=r0. (17)
Invoking this theorem requires verifying [Hong and Liu, 2009, Assumptions 1-3]. [Hong and
Liu, 2009, Assumptions 1-2] are verified immediately by Proposition 1 and Lemma 2. [Hong
and Liu, 2009, Assumption 3] states that {Vt+1,T (r, p e−κY + ψt+1 |β) = vt,α(r, p |β)} is a
zero probability event, which is clear by Proposition 2. To finish the proof, we note that
the conditioning event {Vt+1,T (r, p e−κY + ψt+1 |β) ≥ vt,α(r, p |β)} is equivalent to
{Vt+1,T (r, p e−κY + ψt+1 |β) ≥ Vt+1,T (r, p e−κY + VaRαt(ψt+1) |β)}
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by monotonicity in the spot price (Proposition 2). Inverting both sides gives the desired
characterization {ψt+1 ≥ VaRαt(ψt+1)}.
Theorem 3 (Nonincreasing Threshold in Spot Price). Under Assumption 1, the threshold
rt,T (p |β) is nonincreasing in the spot price p for any degree of dynamic risk-aversion β.
Proof. The proof is by backward induction on t. The induction hypothesis is:
– The quantity p+ ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) is nondecreasing.
Due to the characterization of rt,T (p |β) as the solution to the minimization problem r˜ p+
V˜t,T (r˜, p |β) over r˜ ∈ R, this induction hypothesis implies that rt,T (p |β) is nonincreasing
in p.
Some Remarks. Before continuing with the proof, we make some remarks regarding
differentiability in r and p. The value function Vt+1,T (r, · |β) is piecewise continuously
differentiable7 in the resource state r. This can be shown via an induction argument com-
bined with applications of Lemma 3, the envelope theorem, and the fact that xt,T (r, p |β)
is piecewise linear. Thus, our argument centers on resource states in the interval (0, Rmax)
at which differentiability holds. We then extend the result of the theorem to directional
derivatives at the nondifferentiable endpoints/breakpoints by invoking piecewise continuous
differentiability and taking limits for each “piece.”
Base Case. We first consider the base case, t+ 1 = T , i.e., the case of the terminal value
function Vt,T (s |β). By Assumption 1, the derivative
∂rVt+1,T (r, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β)
= −pref
[
1 + 2γh h(r) + ρβT [γY ((p e
−κY + ψt+1) e−κY + ψt+1,Y )]
]
is a decreasing function in p, and invoking the inequality |ρβt(A)− ρβt(B)| ≤ ρβt(|A−B|),
we have that for any p and q,∣∣∂rVt+1,T (r, p e−κY + ψt+1 |β)− ∂rVt+1,T (r, q e−κY + ψt+1 |β)∣∣ ≤ pref LγY e−2κY |p− q|.
Since the Lipschitz constant satisfies LγY ≤ p−1ref e2κY (by Assumption 1), the right-hand-side
of the inequality above can be bounded by |p− q|. By Lemma 3, we have
∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) = (1− λt) E
[
∂rVt+1,T (r, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β)
]
+ λt E
[
∂rVt+1,T (r, p e
−κY + ψt+1 |β) |ψt+1 ≥ VaRαt(ψt+1)
]
,
7The notion of piecewise continuously differentiability for some function f : [a, b] → R states that there
exists ai with a = a0 < a1 < · · · < an = b such that f is continuously differentiable when restricted to
[ai, ai+1] for each i < n. More precisely, for a fixed i, f
′(x) at x ∈ (ai, ai+1) is the derivative, while f ′(ai) is
the right derivative, and f ′(ai+1) is the left derivative and f ′ is continuous on [ai, ai+1]. By Theorem 2, the
optimal policy xt,T (r, p |β) is piecewise linear and hence, piecewise continuously differentiable in r.
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which satisfies |∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) − ∂rV˜t,T (r, q |β)
∣∣ ≤ |p − q|. Therefore, it follows that the
quantity p+ ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) is nondecreasing in p.
Inductive Step (Part 1). Let us now consider the value function at time t evaluated
at the spot price P = p e−κY + ψt (i.e., from the perspective of time t − 1). Recall that
the optimal policy at time t, by Theorem 2, is to charge up to (or as close as possible to)
the threshold rt,T (p |β). We define the price sets Plow(r) = {P : r + xmax < rt,T (p |β)},
Pmed(r) = {P : r ≤ rt,T (p |β) ≤ r + xmax}, and Phigh(r) = {P : rt,T (p |β) < r}, where it
is possible for some of these sets to be empty.
Due to rt,T (p |β) being nonincreasing in p, these price sets are disjoint and monotone
in the sense that any element of Plow(r) is no greater than any element of Pmed(r), and
any element of Pmed(r) is no greater than any element of Phigh(r). See Figure 15 for an
illustration.
r
r + xmax
Plow(r) Pmed(r) Phigh(r)
rt,T (P |β)
Figure 15: Illustration of the Price Sets
The value function can be written using the optimal policy and the post-decision value
function:
Vt,T (r, p |β) = xt,T (r, p |β) · P − cf + V˜ βt,T (r + xt,T (r, p |β), P ).
Doing casework on each of the spot price intervals, we have
Vt,T (r, p |β) =

xmax · P − cf + V˜t,T (r + xmax, P |β) if P ∈Plow(r),
(rt,T (p |β)− r) · P − cf + V˜t,T (rt,T (p |β), P |β) if P ∈Pmed(r),
−cf + V˜t,T (r, P |β) if P ∈Phigh(r).
Differentiating in r and adding P to both sides, we have
P + ∂rVt,T (r, p |β) =

P + ∂rV˜t,T (r + xmax, P |β) if P ∈Plow(r),
0 if P ∈Pmed(r),
P + ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) if P ∈Phigh(r).
Recall the characterization of rt,T (p |β) minimizes the quantity r˜ p + V˜t,T (r˜, p |β). For
P ∈ Plow(r), we can infer by convexity and the property r + xmax < rt,T (p |β) that
P + ∂rV˜t,T (r + xmax, P |β) ≤ 0. Similar reasoning yields P + ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) ≥ 0 for P ∈
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Phigh(r). Hence, P + ∂rVt,T (r, p |β) is nondecreasing in P .
Inductive Step (Part 2). Given this, we are now able to more easily analyze the main
quantity of interest, p+ ∂rV˜T−1,T (r, p |β). By Lemma 3, we have
p+ ∂rV˜T−1,T (r, p |β) = (1− λt)
[
p+ E
[
∂rVT,T (r, p e
−κY + ψT |β)
]]
+ λt
[
p+ E
[
∂rVT,T (r, p e
−κY + ψT |β) |ψt ≥ VaRαt(ψt)
]]
.
(18)
The first term in brackets can be written as
p+ E
[
∂rVT,T (r, p e
−κY + ψT |β)
]
= p+ E
[
P + ∂rVt,T (r, p |β)− P
]
= (p− p e−κY )−E(ψt) + E
[
P + ∂rVt,T (r, p |β)
]
,
which is clearly nondecreasing in p given the property we proved in Part 1. The second
term is the same, except with conditional expectations that do not depend on p.
Lemma 4 (Decreasing Marginal Value in Price). Under Assumption 1, the pre-decision and
post-decision marginal value of energy, ∂rVt,T (r, p |β) and ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β), are nonincreasing
in the spot price p for any fixed risk-aversion β.
Proof. We proceed via induction. The base case, that ∂rV˜T−1,T (r, p |β), is nonincreasing
in the spot price can be easily verified by essentially repeating the proof for the base case
of Theorem 3. For the inductive step, we assume the property holds at t and verify it for
t− 1. Let P = p e−κY +ψt. Following the definitions from the proof of Theorem 3, we have
∂rVt,T (r, p |β) =

∂rV˜t,T (r + xmax, P |β) if P ∈Plow(r),
−P if P ∈Pmed(r),
∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) if P ∈Phigh(r).
Although this function is clearly piecewise nonincreasing from the induction hypothesis,
we would like to verify that ∂rVt,T (r, p |β) nonincreasing over all P . We first consider the
term ∂rV˜t,T (r + xmax, P |β). When P ∈ Plow(r) and the optimal unconstrained charge
level rt,T (p |β) is not reachable from r, we can apply the same reasoning as in the proof
of Theorem 3 to deduce via convexity that P + ∂rV˜t,T (r + xmax, P |β) ≤ 0. When P ∈
Pmed(r), we know that rt,T (p |β) is reachable from r and thus it follows that P +∂rV˜t,T (r+
xmax, P |β) ≥ 0. Rearranging these inequalities, we can see that
∂rVt,T (r, p |β) = min
{−P, ∂rV˜t,T (r + xmax, P |β)} if P ∈Plow(r) ∪Pmed(r). (19)
By the induction hypothesis, ∂rVt,T (r, p |β) is the minimum of two nonincreasing functions
on P ∈Plow(r) ∪Pmed(r).
Now let us consider the term ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β). For P ∈Pmed(r), the optimal charge level
is reachable and thus r ≤ rt,T (p |β); by convexity P +∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) ≤ 0. For P ∈Phigh(r),
we have r > rt,T (p |β) and thus P + ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β) ≥ 0. Therefore,
∂rVt,T (r, p |β) = max
{−P, ∂rV˜t,T (r, p |β)} if P ∈Pmed(r) ∪Phigh(r). (20)
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Combining (19) and (20), we see that ∂rVt,T (r, p |β) is nonincreasing over all P ∈ R. This
proves the first part of the lemma. To conclude the second part, we invoke Lemma 3 to get
∂rV˜T−1,T (r, p |β) = (1− λt) E
[
∂rVT,T (r, p e
−κY + ψT |β)
]
+ λt E
[
∂rVT,T (r, p e
−κY + ψT |β) |ψt ≥ VaRαt(ψt)
]
.
The right-hand-side is clearly nonincreasing in p.
Theorem 4 (Compatibility in General Charging Regime). Fix any reservation horizon T
and the risk-aversion β∗−0 = (λ∗1, α∗1, . . . , λ∗T , α
∗
T ) for all periods except the first. Let
B(β∗−0) = {β = (λ0, α0, λ∗1, α∗1, . . . , λ∗T , α∗T ) : λ0 ∈ [0, 1], α0 ∈ (0, 1)}
be the set of risk-aversion parameters where (λt, αt) matches (λ
∗
t , α
∗
t ) of β
∗−0 while the risk-
aversion in the first period is a “free parameter.” Taking the partial order ≤ to be the
componentwise inequality on R2 gives compatibility on the set B(β∗−0) between ρ0,T ( · |β)
and any resource-monotone f−T .
Proof. By Lemma 3, we have the equation
∂rV˜0,T (r, p |β) = (1− λ0) E
[
∂rV1,T (r, p e
−κY + ψ1 |β)
]
+ λ0 E
[
∂rV1,T (r, p e
−κY + ψ1 |β) |ψ1 ≥ VaRα0(ψ1)
]
.
(21)
We note that by the dynamic programming property of Theorem 1, the value function V β1,T
at time t = 1 depends only on β∗−0 and not on the risk-aversion of the first time period
β0 = (λ0, α0). By the nonincreasing property of ∂rV
β
1,T (r, p) in p from Lemma 4, it follows
that
E
[
∂rV1,T (r, p e
−κY + ψ1 |β) |ψ1 ≥ VaRα0(ψ1)
] ≤ E[∂rV1,T (r, p e−κY + ψ1 |β)]
and α0 7→ E
[
∂rV1,T (r, p e
−κY +ψ1 |β) |ψ1 ≥ VaRα0(ψ1)
]
is nonincreasing. Combining these
two properties allows us to conclude from (21) that ∂rV˜0,T (r, p |β) is nonincreasing in β
over B(β∗−0), which in turn implies that the charging threshold r0,T (p |β) is nondecreasing.
The thresholds for t > 0 remain unchanged when β (again by the dynamic programming
property) and thus, it is easy to conclude that RβT ≤ Rβ
′
T almost surely when β ≤ β′. Risk
compatibility follows by the resource-monotonicity property of f−T .
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